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NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITING: ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS
IN STATE AUTHORITY?*
INTRODUCTION

A recent order' of a Florida administrative hearing officer 2 that barred
the admission of certain evidence in a power plant siting proceeding heralds
a federal-state conflict of potentially large proportions. At issue is the extent
to which a state is precluded from considering the radiological effects of
nuclear power plants in its site certification proceedings.3
Following application by Florida Power and Light Company for certification of a nuclear power plant site in St. Lucie County, Florida, public
hearings were conducted pursuant to Florida's Electrical Power Plant Siting
Act.4 Local residents who opposed certification of -the plant site sought toraise issues regarding the hazards that radiation poses to the health and
safety of the public5 The hearing officer, however, concluded that evidence
relating to radiological matters was irrelevant and immaterial to state site
certification proceedings and was therefore inadmissible.6 This finding was
predicated on preemption by the federal government of the authority to
"regulate the radiological aspects of a nuclear power fadlity."7 The Atomic
*EDrroR's NoTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize
for the best student note submitted in the Fall 1975 quarter.
1. Preliminary Order of Hearing Examiner, In re Florida Power & Light Company
Application for Power Plant Site Certification, St. Lucie Nuclear Plant No. 2, St. Lucie
County, Florida, Application No. PA-74-02; Case No. 75-006 (May 13, 1975), incorporated
by reference in the final order, Findings of Fact and Recommended Order to the
Cabinet (Oct. 8, 1975).
2. The hearing and order were entered pursuant to FLA. STAT. §§403.501-15 (1975).
This order must be reviewed by the governor and cabinet. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 22, §5(2).
The cabinet on Dec. 17, 1975, in Order No. 82 unanimously remanded to the hearing
officer and established an April 15, 1976, deadline for hearings involving the previously
omitted question of radiation effects on health and safety. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Dec. 17,
1975, §D at 1,col. 4. For a general discussion of the Florida Electrical Power Plant Siting
Act see, Maloney, More Heat Than Light, Thermal Pollution Versus Heat Energy Utilization, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 693 (1978).
3. See Order May 13, 1975, supra note 1.
4. FrA. STAT. ch. 403 Part II (1975). Florida Power and Light Company had constructed a nuclear plant on the site in question (St. Lucie Power Plant No. 1) prior to
the 1973 effective date of the act.
5. Several citizens' groups were interested in this issue and in the effects of the
nuclear plant. Additionally, the Florida Department of Pollution Control filed a memorandum
of law setting forth the Department's position regarding the effect of preemption by
the federal government in the area of nuclear safety. Memorandum of Law, Department of
Pollution Control, Application No. PA-74-02. The Martin County Conservation Alliance
also filed a brief with the hearing examiner regarding the issue of federal preemption as
it relates to the Florida Electrical Power Plant Siting Act. (Brief filed April 14, 1975).
6. See Order May 13, 1975, supra note 1, at 3. The Hearing Officer did allow admission
of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) findings of fact and conclusions regarding
radiological aspects of the site and considered them binding on the states. Id. at 5.
7. Id. at 3. As authority, the examiner cited Northern States v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d
1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
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Energy Acts was interpreted to give the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
the exclusive authority to regulate radiation hazards posed by nuclear power
plants. 9
A similar question was recently raised in the state of New York. Proceedings before a Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environment
involved site certification of two nuclear fueled units in Suffolk County. 10
The New York State Department of Environmental Conservation requested
an order requiring the applicant to testify as to radiological environmental
impacts.1 1 The Presiding Examiner, however, ruled that the state was preempted from considering radiological health and safety matters12 and that
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC)' 3 determinations of radiological
environmental impacts were inextricably part of its health and safety requirements.' 4 Because of this finding, the Examiners excluded from the proceeding
all evidence pertaining to radiological health and safety.' 5
State hearing examiners in nuclear site certification proceedings encounter
issues that, though initially evidentiary, ultimately focus on important statefederal relationships. Application of the preemption doctrine to limit the
state's role in the selection of nuclear power plant sites encroaches on the
6
traditional state jurisdiction over land use and environmental controls.'
Current domestic energy problems also complicate an evaluation of the
legality of the federal limitation on the state role in nuclear site certification.17 Development of nuclear power plants is critical to achieving selfsufficiency of energy resources;' yet, the planning and construction of nuclear
plants requires an average of ten years in the United States, 19 as compared to
five to six years elsewhere. 20 If the national goal of energy self-sufficiency is
8. 42 U.S.C. §§2011 et seq. (1970).
9. Northern States v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
It should be noted that the AEC's authority has now been inherited by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC).
10. State of New York, Department of Public Service, Case No. 80008, Long Island Lighting Company-Jamesport Generating Station, Nuclear Units 1 & 2, Ruling Admissibility of
Evidence on Radiological Health and Safety, Order of the Presiding Examiner (April 9,
1975).
11. Id. at l.
12. Id. at 7.
13. The NRC inherited its iegulatory authority from the AEC.
14. See Order of Presiding Examiner, supra note 10, at 10.
15. Id. at 12. "Wherefore no testimony or other evidence will be received in this
proceeding on radiological health and safety, including radiological environmental impacts,
resulting from NRC-licensed nuclear powered generating stations, regardless of pathway,
whether direct or indirect, or through wildlife and vegetation not ordinarily edible by
humans and concerning other incidental radiological hazards." Id.
16. See text accompanying notes 71-80 infra.
17. See Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Nuclear Powerplant
Siting and Licensing, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings].
18. Almost 60% of the order for electrical generating capacity in 1973 was for
nuclear power plants. Id. at 1.
19. Testimony of Lee Gossick, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Hearings Before
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Nuclear Powerplant Siting and Licensing, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (June 25, 1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Hearings].
20. 1974 Hearings, supra note 17, at 1.
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to be achieved, the planning and construction of power plants must be
considerably expedited.
The state role in nuclear plant siting represents one possible area in
which time may be saved.2 1 Development of an inventory of approved sites
sufficient to satisfy the nation's need for additional nuclear capacity may
facilitate the development of nuclear plants. 22 Standardization of siting procedures and federal assumption of portions of the state role in siting nuclear
plants may also accomplish a time savings, 23 but serious doubts as to the
magnitude of the potential time savings pose challenging questions for a
24
Congress that must consider competing state and federal interests. In addition, safety problems within the industry seem to necessitate the consideration
of evidence of radiological impact in state proceedings.2 5 It is the purpose
21. Barriers to development of the atomic industry are posed by states that threaten
moratoriums on nuclear construction. For example, in 1974 some California citizens attempted
to force a public vote on a "Nuclear Energy Safety Act" that threatened to pose a de
facto moratorium on. construction of new nuclear plants. 1974 Hearings, supra note 7, at
25. Again, in June of 1976, Californians defeated by a 2-1 vote Proposition 15, an antinuclear initiative that received considerable support from the protest resignations of
three General Electric nuclear engineers who were concerned with the safety threats of
nuclear reactors. NEwswEEK, Feb. 16, 1976, at 64. This result may influence the votes now
scheduled on nuclear energy in 10 other states.
A lack of state commitment to fund siting programs may also raise the cost to utilities
of the certification procedure and cause delays arising from an inability of the state
technical staff to handle a heavy work load. States have already complained that they
have insufficient funds to fulfill the regulatory responsibilities delegated to them by
the AEC pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2021 (1970). 1974 Hearings, supra note 17, at 24, 43. Some
opponents of nuclear power plant siting legislation have questioned the need for additional
sites. Others point to the inadequacy of existing base line data on the demand for electrical
energy and the inventory of existing sites that have been approved and contend that
nuclear site requirements can be accomplished without a greatly accelerated program.
See, e.g., Testimony Regarding Energy Facility Siting Legislation Before the Senate Interior

Committee, Marc Messing, available from Environmental Policy Center, May 15, 1975.
22. The heart of recent proposals by the NRC to Congress (H.R. 7002, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975)) involves early site reviews and standardized facility designs. The proposals
would enable states employing an early-site permit process to develop both comprehensive
energy facility plans and an inventory of approved sites for later use by applicant utilities.
See Testimony of Marcus Rowden, Commissioner, NRC, 1975 Hearings, supra note 19, at 5-6.
23. See H.R. 3734, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975) (proposal to establish by state-federal
agreement a process whereby the NRC may impose requirements on siting of nuclear
plants through state proceedings).
24. Analysis of a typical 10-year sequence for development reveals that 6 to 7 years
of that time are needed to complete the construction phase. The NRC evaluations of
environmental and safety aspects of a proposal have steadily required less time since
1971 and in 1975 required only 16 months. The projection for 1976 was 14 months. A
utility requires only two years from conception to accomplish applicant planning, site
evaluation, preliminary design, and preparation of a NRC application. See Testimony of
Lee Gossick, 1975 Hearings, supranote 19, at 1, 6, 10.
25. For example, the emergency core-cooling systems designed to cool the overheating
of nuclear fuel have never been tested. Wall Street Journal, July 9, 1975, at 1, col. 8. In
fact, when one nuclear unit needed to be shut down, the emergency system failed. Id. This
and similar problems, such as radioactive leakages from reactor cores and the dumping of
superheated water, have caused the Union of Concerned Scientists to petition President Ford
to reduce the pace of nuclear power plant construction. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Aug. 6,
1975, §D, at 8, col. 1. See also Nawswsac, Feb. 16, 1976, at 64.
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of this note to examine the state's role in the siting of nuclear power
plants and the consequences that may arise if a state is precluded from
evaluating radiological matters. To this end, this note will explore the
legislative history of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act and its 1959 amendments,
the subsequent judicial delineation of the state's role, and the practical and
policy effects of alternative state roles.
HISTORY

The state role in nuclear power plant siting has been greatly influenced
by the unique manner in which the atomic energy industry developed in
the United States.

26

Ordinarily, decentralized authorities initially control the

localized activities of a new industry. As the industry begins to affect interstate commerce, or as local and state regulation becomes ineffective, increased
federal regulation occurs. Ultimately, the trend toward centralized regulation
may result in federal preemption of some part or all of a previously defined
state regulatory role. The early development of atomic energy, however, was
the result of the World War II military effort. It was financed by the federal
treasury and protected by a cloak of secrecy.2 7 While Congress in

1946

transferred the responsibility for developing atomic energy from military
to civilian sources, the industry remained under the control of the federal
government.28 Thus, state governments could reasonably rely on the federal

29
government to regulate the growing atomic energy industry.

The passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 195430 forced the states to
concern themselves with the burgeoning atomic industry. In an effort to
encourage the widespread development of the industry while still protecting
the health and safety of its citizens, Congress created a new class of licensees
from the organizations that formerly were agents and contractors of the
government. 31 The initiative for industrial development shifted from the
federal government to its licensees, and the cloak of federal immunity was
removed. 32 This removal of immunity, coupled with tremendous growth of

26.

See W.

BERMAN

& L. HYDEMAN,

A

STUDY -

FEDERAL AND

STATE RESPONSIBILITIES

FOR

RADIATION PROTECTION: THE NEED FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION (Univ. of Mich., Jan. 1959);
Krebs & Hamilton, The Role of the States in Atomic Development, 21 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 182-210 (1956).
27. Selected Materials on Federal-State Cooperation in the Atomic Energy Field, Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 495 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Selected
Materials].
28. Krebs & Hamilton, supra note 26, at 182.
29. Id.
30. Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§2011-2281 (1970).
This Act was originally passed in 1946 but was completely revised in 1954.
31. See Selected Materials,supra note 27, at 495.
32. See Krebs & Hamilton, supra note 26, at 182-83. The act permitted private construction and ownership of reactors, as well as private possession of nuclear fuels. In
1957, Congress enacted amendments protecting the industry from unlimited liability, yet
left control over the adjudication of radiation injury claims to the states. E. STASON, S.
ESTEP & W. PIERCE, ATOMS AND THE LAW 573-74 (1959).
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the nuclear industry, provided state governments with the opportunity to
33
influence industrial development.
Congressional guidance to the states in fashioning a regulatory framework
for the nascent nuclear industry is absent from the legislative history of
the 1954 Act.3 4 It appears, however, that Congress did not seek to establish
regulatory principles for control of the then nonexistent nuclear power
plant industry.35 Proponents of the Atomic Energy Act strongly emphasized
that the purpose of the act was to promote the utilization of atomic energy. 36
Additionally, the Act did not disturb existing state and local jurisdiction over
electric power generating facilities, regardless of whether atomic fuel was
to be used. 37 While the extent of state jurisdiction over some activities
regulated by the AEC lacked clarity in 1954, certain radiological hazards
were not covered by the Act and clearly fell within the purview of state
authorities.3
In 1959 amendments to the Atomic Energy Act attempted to clarify the
extent of the state's role and its authority over the developing nuclear power
industry. A new section entitled "Cooperation with States" was added to
the Act 39 dealing almost entirely with agreements for voluntary assumption
by the states of certain AEC regulatory authority.40 A state could agree to
assume AEC regulatory and licensing authority with respect to source ma33. State interest was further developed by the possible industrial impact of the
new licensees and concern for the health and safety of its citizens. See Selected Materials,
supra note 27, at 495-96.
34. See generally UNrrED STATES AToMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, LEIsLATVnE HISTORy OF
THE ATOMIC ENERGY Acr oF 1954 (1955).
35. The Chairman of the Joint Committee, Congressman Sterling Cole, emphasized
that no regulatory or proprietary principals were being established. "Several years from
now, I presume that the Congress will be required to stake out the ground rules for an
atomic industry - to set forth the terms and conditions under which the American
people will enjoy the benefits of electric power developed from nuclear sources. That problem,
however, is not the concern of the bills now before the Joint Committee.
"I emphasize with all the force at my command that the problem before us in 1954
is not the formulation of federal policy for a non-existent atomic power industry." Address
by Congressman Sterling Cole, Washington, D.C., May 24, 1954, quoted in Lemov, State
and Local Control Over the Location of Nuclear Reactors Under the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1008, 1018 (1964).
36. See Lemov, supra note 35 at 1018.
37. Id. at 1019. Congress seemed "aware of the existing state-federal balance in the
electric utility field and intended to apply the same principals to the commercial atomic
power industry." Id. at 1021.
38. Radiological hazards not regulated by the federal government include: a. natural
radiation emitting elements (such as radium); b. x-ray and gamma ray machines; c. radioisotopes produced in high energy machines as particle accelerators. See Selected Materials,
supra note 27, at 3. Additionally, the AEC (now NRC) is not involved in regulating
nuclear mining activities, although transport of nuclear materials is regulated. Estep &
Adelman, State Control of Radiation Hazards: An Intergovernmental Relations Problem,
60 Micr. L. Rav. 41, 53 (1961).
39. Act of Sept. 23, 1959, Pub. L. 86-373, §1, 73 Stat. 688, codified as 42 U.S.C. §2021
(1970).
40. 42 U.S.C. §2021 (1970). A minor provision, §2021(h), sets forth consultative, advisory, and miscellaneous functions of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency. All other provisions directly address the new state authority.
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terials, by-product materials, and special nuclear materials in quantities not
sufficient to form a critical mass.4 1 Although state jurisdiction over matters
within the scope of the agreement is exclusive, certain activities were
specifically omitted from any AEC-state accord. These included the construction and operation of production or utilization facilities such as nuclear
power plants.4 ' While no language in the 1959 Amendments expressly preempted the field of regulation of nuclear facilities, subsection (k) has been read
as implying preemption with respect to the issue of radiological health and
safety. 43 Thus, in enacting the 1954 Act and 1959 amendments, Congress
manifested its intention to provide for federal preemption of some aspects
of regulation of nuclear powered plants, but both acts failed to address the
question of state and local jurisdiction over the location and siting of nuclear
power plants."
JUDICIAL DELINEATION OF THE STATE ROLE

Courts have had little occasion to consider the state role in the nuclear
energy field. Perhaps this is due to attempts by the companies involved to
satisfy regulations promulgated by both the state and the AEC. Cases may
not reach the courts if state regulations are not unduly burdensome or if
companies are reluctant to antagonize powerful state officials by bringing
suit.

45

One of the first instances46 in which a court evaluated the extent to
41. 42 U.S.C. §2021(b) (1970). Two requirements must be met by the state prior to
agreement with the AEC: "i) the governor of the state must certify that the state has
a program for the control of radiation hazards adequate to protect the public health and
safety, and ii) the AEC must find the state program is compatible with the commission's
program and adequate to protect the public health and safety." 42 U.S.C. §2021(d) (1970).
42. "No agreement entered into pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall provide for discontinuance of any authority and the Commission shall retain authority and
responsibility with respect to regulation of1. the construction and operation of any production or utilization facility...."
42 U.S.C. §2021(c) (1970).
43. 10 C.F.R. §8.4 (1975). "Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the
authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards." 42 U.S.C. §2021(k) (1970). For a further discussion of
subsection (k), see text accompanying notes 122-123, 138 infra.
44. A desire by the AEC to leave detailed questions concerning state-federal relationships
to the judiciary is discerned from the legislative history of the amendments. See Lemov,
supra note 35, at 1018.
45. Estep & Adelman, supra note 38, at 43.
46. Boswell v. City of Long Beach, CCH ATOM. EN. L. REP. 4045 (Los Angeles
Super. Ct., March 21, 1960), briefly considered the siting of a radioactive waste-disposal plant
by a city. Already licensed by the AEC, the plant was granted a business license by all city
departments. Three months later, shortly following press announcements of the arrival of
the first radioactive wastes, the city revoked the license approval and began criminal
prosecution of plaintiff for engaging in business without a license. Basing its opinion
on the unlawful license revocation ground and on preemption by 42 U.S.C. §2021(c)(3) and
(4), the court enjoined the city from preventing plaintiff from engaging in his business. Id.
In light of reliance on this case by an opinion of the General Counsel of the AEC regarding preemptive authority, 10 C.F.R. §8.4 (1975), it is necessary to note the absence
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which the Atomic Energy Act preempted the states from considering safety

aspects of nuclear reactor sites occurred in 1964. In Northern California
Association to Preserve Bodega Head and Harbor v. Public Utilities Commission,4 7 the Pacific Gas and Electric Company had applied for a state
certificate of public convenience that was necessary to construct a nuclear
powered plant in Bodega Bay, California. Following public hearings, protests were received from various opponents to the plant, who were concerned that their evidence might not be given full effect" and that the Public
Utilities Commission would grant a certificate for an unsafe plant. Although
upholding the grant of a state certificate on a procedural matter, the Supreme
Court of California concluded that the federal government had not pre49
empted the question of safety surrounding the location of atomic reactors.

The court cited subdivision (k) of section 2021,50 finding it "clear that the
federal government has not preempted the field, at least with respect to the
phase of protecting the public from hazards other than radiation
hazards ..

. ."51 The limitation of the court's holding to non-radiological

hazards indicates a reluctance to consider the extent of state authority over
radiological hazards. Despite this reluctance, the court proceeded to find
that the "state's powers in determining the location of atomic reactors are
not limited to matters of zoning or similar local interests other than
52
safety."
While few courts have focused directly on the state function in the siting
of nuclear plants, insight into this role may be found by examining the
numerous cases dealing with federal involvement in nuclear power plant
siting. The regulatory jurisdiction of the AEC, as granted by the amended
Atomic Energy Act, is confined to the scrutiny of and protection against
both of in-depth analysis of the Atomic Energy Act and of other sources of authority. 42
U.S.C. §§2021(c)(3) and

(4) read in part, "the Commission shall retain authority and

responsibility with respect to regulation of . . . (3) the disposal into the ocean or sea
of . . . special nuclear waste materials ..
" and "(4) the disposal of such other byproduct, source, or special nuclear material as the Commission determines...." Thus
Boswell should be narrowly read and can be easily distinguished from plant siting
decisions.
47. 61 Cal. 2d 126, 390 P.2d 200, 37 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1964).
48. The Sierra Club, as friend of the court, late in the hearings filed a "Motion for a
Ruling on the Relevancy of Evidence in Regard to Application" in order to preserve a
foundation for appeal if the commission did not consider certain safety testimony relevant
when making its decision. The commission determined it was not possible to declare
any type of testimony irrelevant to its proceedings. Id. at 129 n.la, 390 P.2d at 201 n.la, 37 Cal.
Rptr. at 433-34 n.la. All the evidence was considered.
49. Id. at 133-34, 390 P.2d at 204, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 436. The protestants of agency
action had not timely filed a petition for rehearing in that it was more than five (5) months
after the certificate decision became effective. The court, however, reviewed, the safety
considerations of the board and found they had considered them adequately and were
within their authority. Id. at 136, 390 P.2d at 206, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
50. 42 U.S.C. §2021(k) (1970): "Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the
authority of any State or local agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards."
51. 61 Cal. 2d at 133, 390 P.2d at 204, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 436 (emphasis added).
52. Id.
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hazards from radiation. 53 The judiciary recognized this limit when the
states of New Hampshire, Vermont, and Massachusetts sought court review
of an AEC licensing proceeding- that granted a provisional construction
permit to build the Vermont Yankee nuclear power reactor. 55 The states
sought to introduce evidence intended to show that thermal pollution would
harm the natural resources of the Connecticut River if the reactors were
permitted to operate without a cooling tower system. 56 When the Commission
refused to consider the issue of thermal pollution because it was beyond
its regulatory jurisdiction, the states sued contending that the Commission
must consider all aspects of "health and safety of the public." 57 The First
Circuit disagreed and found it to be the intent of Congress that the AEC
consider health and safety only in the context of radiation hazards.5 8 The
court recognized the serious gap between the dangers of technology and the
protections afforded by law to natural resources.5 9 Lack of planning merely
invited "the unnecessary dilemma of choosing between harming the natural
environment, with harmful effects on even the health and well being of
humans, and frustrating the needed production of power."'60 Nevertheless,
in the absence of a statutory definition of "health and safety,"'- the court refused to utilize its ordinary meaning as urged by the states.6 2 Examining
the legislative history of the act, 63 the court noted only a few unilluminating
references to "health and safety" in the voluminous legislative history of the
1954 Act. 64 Deeming the definition settled prior to the passage of the 1954
Act,65 the court gave weight to the AEC interpretation of the term because
of the close relationship between the Commission and the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy. 66 Further bolstering of this limited definition of "health and
to the
safety" was drawn from the 1959 amendments, which specifically refer
"protection of the public health and safety from radiation hazards."67
By this construction the AEC was clearly limited in its authority under
53.
(1969).
54.
et seq.
55.

New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170, 175 (lst Cir.). cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962
This is not to say the authority is inclusive of all radiation protection issues.
The proceeding was conducted pursuant to authority granted by 42 U.S.C. §§2011
(1970).
406 F.2d at 171-72.

56. Id. at 172.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 175. The Act of 1954 and its 1959 amendments contain many references
to health and safety.

59. Id. at 173.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 174-75. The court noted particularly §§2021(b) and (k).
64. Id. at 174 nA.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 174. The Supreme Court, in Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of Electrical Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 409 (1961), noted the close statutory relation between this joint committee of Congress and the Commission and read the relationship "as a de facto acquiescence in and ratification of the Commission's licensing procedures
by Congress."
67. 406 F.2d at 175.
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the Atomic Energy Act to consider only those aspects of health and safety
relating to radiation protection. 68 The court's holding gave the AEC
flexibility to refuse to consider other safety issues,6 9 but it also threatened to
70
create a gap in regulation if states were to be precluded from this role.
While AEC regulatory jurisdiction remained limited, the concern given
by the AEC to nonradiological matters expanded dramatically in 1971. The
National Environmental Policy Act of 196971 (NEPA) mandated consideration of environmental issues "to the fullest extent possible." 72 Two years
later, a successful court challenge to certain of its proceedings forced the
AEC to consider nonradiological environmental issues. 73 The holding of the
4
landmark case of Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC7 created

complications in the administration of the AEC and resulted in a 17-month
hiatus in the granting of permits for construction or operation of nuclear
reactors. 75 At issue were AEC administrative rules that precluded review
of environmental questions unless they were specifically raised and not decided
by other agencies. Examining the Act and its legislative history, the court
found the AEC rules were violative of NEPA's mandate to exercise substantive
76
discretion that would protect the environment to the fullest extent possible.
This decision forced inclusion of nonradiological environmental issues in
AEC proceedings 77 and greatly increased the contextual richness of the many
factors that must be considered by the AEC before reaching its decisions. Rule
modifications have incorporated the requirements of NEPA into the procedures of the AEC.78 The effect of NEPA is not to preempt state authority,7 9
but to mandate federal consideration of nonradiological environmental
issues. 80
68. AEC jurisdiction was narrowly construed in Statesville v. AEC, 441 F.2d 962 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
69. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
70. For example, is a state precluded from regulating the effect of "non-hazardous'

radioactive materials on the environment if they do not pose a threat to the public in
the AEC view? Is the decisionmaking perspective of the AEC fragmented to the degree that

important synergistic effects cannot be adequately evaluated due- to a limited AEC jurisdiction? Justice Van Oosterhout, in his 'dissent in Northern States v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1154,
1157 (8th Cir. 1971), noted that "close factual issues may arise whether pollution is
caused by radiation or by other pollutants."
71. 42 U.S.C. § §4321-47 (1970).
72. 42 U.S.C. §4332 (1970).
73. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm'n v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
74. Id.
75. See 1974 Hearings,supra note 17, at 6.
76. 449 F.2d at 1129.
77. The AEC must consider such issues regardless of whether they will be passed
on by other agencies. 449 F.2d at 1123.
78. 10 C.F.R. §11 (1975).
79. The supremacy clause only operates to preempt state authority if it is in conflict
with the express or presumed intent of Congress. See text accompanying notes 89-98 infra.
80. Even though the NRC must now consider environmental issues because of NEPA,
states still have concurrent jurisdiction to consider radiological issues not involving
"health and safety," but it is speculative whether such issues exist. For example, the states'
concern for the minor radiological effects of nuclear plant effluents on animals such as
nanny goats, and the effect of cumulative radiation from phosphate mines may have a
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The preemptive effect of the Atomic Energy Act and its 1959 "FederalState Cooperation" amendment 8 ' on the state role was affirmatively delineated
in the case of Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota.82 Plaintiff was
authorized by a provisional construction permit 3 to build a nuclear plant on
the banks of the Mississippi River.8 4 A permit was issued by the Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency allowing plaintiff to dispose of waste subject to
specified conditions regulating the level of radioactive discharges. 85 The conditions imposed by the Minnesota permit were "substantially more stringent
than those imposed by AEC under the federal law."8 6 Plaintiff then sought
a declaratory judgment concerning "whether the federal government, through
the United States Atomic Energy Commission . . .had exclusive authority to
regulate the radioactive waste releases from nuclear power plants so as to
preclude Minnesota from exercising any regulatory authority over the release
of such discharges ....
"87 In a cogently reasoned opinion, the Eighth Circuit
held "that the Federal Government has exclusive authority under the doctrine
of pre-emption to regulate the construction and operation of nuclear power
plants, which necessarily includes regulation of the levels of radioactive
8
effluents discharged from the plant."11
The Northern States court identified two stages of judicial analysis required in the consideration of federal preemption problems inherent in state
nuclear power plant siting.8 9 First, courts must determine whether the congressional action establishing the federal regulation was itself constitutional. 9o
Finding that Congress acted constitutionally, the courts must then ascertain
whether Congress legislated in such a way as to preclude the states from
asserting concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject matter.9 '
Federal preemption of the states will be found in the second stage of
analysis only if one of the following conditions is met: (1) compliance

basis in political, if not in "health and safety" realities. See Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Oct.
8, 1975, §D, at 3, col. 1.
81. 42 U.S.C. §2021 (1970).
82. 320 F. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), afl'd,
405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
83. 447 F.2d at 1145. Issued June 19, 1967, by the AEC, the permit was authorized
by §104(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. §2134(b)). Id.
84. 447 F.2d at 1145.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1144.
88. Id. at 1154. Although the court did not limit this expression of its holding to
radiation hazards, it may be reasonably inferred from the structure and analysis of the
opinion.
89. In developing its two stage analysis, the court recognized the compelling controversies surrounding the issues of nuclear power, environmental concerns, and federal-state
relationships.
90. Id. at 1146. The doctrine of preemption elevates federal law above that of
the states. U.S. CONST. art. VI, clause 2 provides: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law
of the land .. "
91. 447 F.2d at 1146.
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with both federal and state regulations is a "physical impossibility"; 92
(2) there is an express congressional intent to displace coincident state regulation;93 or (3) there is an implied congressional intent to displace coincident
state regulation. 94 Courts will be aided in inferring congressional intent
through consideration of the following factors: (a) "the aim and intent of
Congress as revealed by the statute itself and legislative history"; 95 (b) the
pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme as originally legislated and
subsequently effectuated by the concerned federal agency; 96 (c) the nature of
the subject matter with respect to the need for federal regulation to achieve
uniformity vital to national interests; 97 and (d) the interference of state
law with the purpose of Congress.98
Applying this test to the facts of Northern States, the court had no
difficulty in finding that Congress acted clearly within its constitutional
authority in regulating the entire atomic energy field. 9 This authority was
derived from constitutional powers to legislate on matters concerning the
common defense and security, interstate commerce, and promotion of the
general welfare. 00
The possibility of dual compliance with both the federal and the more
stringent state standards, coupled with the absence of a provision expressly
declaring the federal government the exclusive regulatory authority,' 0' requires the court to determine whether Congress intended to preempt the
state regulatory role. 02 Initially, tracing the pre-1959 history of the Atomic
Energy Act,'03 the court noted that the legislative purpose of the 1954
amendments was to encourage private enterprise in the development of
the peaceful purposes of atomic energy. 04 As private ownership of production
92. Id., citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
93. 447 F.2d at 1146, citing Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 302 (1961); Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1947).
94. 447 F.2d at 1146, citing Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd.,
330 U.S. 767, 772 (1947); Napier v. At. Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 613 (1926).
95. 447 F.2d at 1146, citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. at
147-50 (1963); Campbell v. Hussey, 868 U.S. at 301-02 (1961).
96. 447 F.2d at 1146, citing Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-04 (1956); Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York
State Labor Relations Bd., 880 U.S. 767, 774 (1947).
97. 447 F.2d at 1146, citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
143-44 (1968); San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-44 (1959);
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. I, 10-11 (1957); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S.
373, 377 (1946).
98. 447 F.2d at 1147, citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
99. 447 F.2d at 1147. The limits posed by the tenth amendment are somewhat illusory
in the years following United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). If a power was deemed
delegated to Congress, no inquiry was made into its possible reservation by the tenth
amendment. Estep & Adelman, supra note 38, at 45.
100. 42 U.S.C. §§2011-12 (1970). See generally Estep & Adelman, supra note 38, at
45-57.
101. 447 F.2d at 1147.
102. Id.
103. See notes 26-38 supraand accompanying text.
104. 447 F.2d at 1148.
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and utilization facilities was expanded, 10 5 clarification of the roles of the state
and the AEC became necessary. This clarification was supplied by the addition of section 2021.106 After outlining the language of subsections (b) and
(c), 10 7 pertaining to AEC-state agreements to discontinue certain AEC
authority, the court had no doubt that retention of "AEC control over 'the
construction and operation of any production or utilization facility'
necessarily includes control over radioactive effluents discharged from the
plant incident to its operation."' ' s This control must be exclusive to the
AEC, the court reasoned, because no act prior to the 1959 amendments had
granted this authority to the states, and the 1959 amendments recognized
the retained AEC authority. If the states prior to 1959 had possessed concurrent jurisdiction to regulate radiation hazards, Congress would not have
needed to recognize affirmatively the regulatory authority that states might
exercise on executing an AEC-state agreement.10 9 Additionally, the court
noted the repeated use of the terms "discontinuance," when referring to AEC
regulatory authority, and "retention" or "continuation" of authority in areas
delineated in subsection (c). 110 Thus, the court concluded that absent an

105. See notes 32, 34 supra and accompanying text.
106. 42 U.S.C. §2021 (1970). The primary purposes of the section as set out in subsection (a) are: "i) to clarify the respective responsibilities of the states and the AEC; ii) to
establish programs for cooperation and an orderly regulatory pattern between the states
and the AEC; iii) and to establish procedures for discontinuance of certain of the AEC
regulatory responsibilities." 447 F.2d at 1148.
107. 447 F.2d at 1148. 42 U.S.C. §§2021(b) and (c) read in pertinent part "(b) Except
as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the Commission is authorized to enter into
agreements with the Governor of any state providing for discontinuance of the regulatory
authority of the Commission . . . with respect to . . . (1) by-product materials; (2) source
materials; (3)special nuclear materials in quantities not sufficient to form a critical mass.
During the duration of such an agreement it is recognized that the state shall have
authority to regulate the materials covered by the agreement for the protection of the
public health and safety from radiation hazards.
"(c) No agreement entered into pursuant to subsection (b) of this section shall provide
for discontinuance of any authority and the Commission shall retain authority and responsibility with respect to regulation of -(1) the construction and operation of any production or utilization facility ....... (emphasis added).
108. 447 F.2d at 1149 n.6. The inclusiveness of this phase becomes critical in questions
of siting. As support for its position, the court quoted AEC spokesmen who detailed (but
not inclusively) the activities covered by the provision. The activities described were the
possession and storage of nuclear materials at the site, the operation of the facility, the
transportation of nuclear fuels to and from the site, and the discharge of effluent from
the facility. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Federal-State
Relationships in the Atomic Energy Field, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 306 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as 1959 Hearings]. In addition to noting that discharge of effluent involves questions of
design, construction, and operating procedures, the court cited the stipulation of the parties
that waste disposal requirements affect the design, manufacture, cost, and sale of nuclear
reactor plants and equipment. 447 F.2d at 1149 n.6.
109. 447 F.2d at 1149-50. The court particularly noted the language of 42 U.S.C. §2021(b),
which stated that "during the duration of such an agreement it is recognized that the State
shall have authority to regulate the materials covered by the agreement .. .
110. Id.at150.
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agreement under which the AEC relinquished some of its authority to the
states, the states possess no authority to regulate radiation hazards.""
Further bolstering of the argument that preemption by the federal government of the regulation of radiation hazards existed prior to the 1959 amendments is provided by subsection (k),' 12 which states: "Nothing in this section
shall be construed to affect the authority of any state or local agency to
regulate activities for purposes other than protection against radiation
hazards." 1 3 If the federal government did not possess exclusive authority
over radiation hazards, then subsection (k) would be meaningless. Turning to
the legislative history of the 1959 amendment, the court found further support
for preemption" 4 and noted that this intent of Congress coincided with the
intent of the AEC." 5
Accepting the Northern States analysis that precludes states from regulating
the levels of radioactive effluents discharged from a nuclear plant, courts
must now determine the applicability of this finding to a state seeking to
consider radiological factors in its selection of power plant sites. Congress
has the power under the Constitution to regulate the siting of nuclear power
plants;""' moreover, the impact of nuclear power production on interstate
commerce and the dangers radiation poses to health and safety may require
federal regulation of siting. Federal regulatory authority, however, may be
thwarted by state ownership of the projected site."1 If a state refuses to
authorize a nuclear power plant location on state-owned land, even if purely
for radiation safety reasons, it is possible that the supremacy argument will
fail. 1 8 Federal supersedure of state control over state-owned property exceeds
mere regulation and is tantamount to an order forbidding an owner to restrict
certain uses of his property;" x9 however, there is little authority on this point.
Similarly, a state facility on a state site that does not involve interstate
commerce may not be precluded from establishing more st ringent limits
on radioactive effluents by the supremacy argument,"20 but rarely would a

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 42 U.S.C. §2021(k). Accord, Cavers, State Responsibility in the Regulation of Atomic
Reactors, 50 Ky.L.J. 29 (1961); Estep & Adelman, supra note 38, at 41. But see Lemov, State
and Local Control Over the Location of Nuclear Reactors Under the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1008, 1012-14 (1964).
114. 447 F.2d at 1150. See generally 1959 Hearings, supra note 108; Selected Materials,

supra note 27; and Senate Report No. 870 reproduced in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2872 (1959).
115. 447 F.2d at 1152. The factors of pervasiveness of the federal licensing scheme and
the obstacles that would be posed by dual regulation of the industrial development rounded
out the court's discussion. Id.
116. See notes 99-100 supraand accompanying text.
117. See Estep &Adelman, supra note 38,at 54.
118. If the federal government wishes to construct a plant on that site, it must
enter into condemnation proceedings and pay just compensation. The legitimate interests
of the federal government do not seem to outweigh the right of a property owner to
protect health and safety by more stringent standards Id.I
119. Id. at 55 n.53.
120. Id.at 54.
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nuclear reactor not affect interstate commerce. Thus, despite the121assertion
of federal control, state regulation may not be entirely preempted.
Assuming that Congress has delegated power to the AEC to regulate the
siting of nuclear power plants, courts must still determine if this precludes
the states from exercising concurrent jurisdiction. 122 The rule of Northern
States only restrains a state from regulating the construction and operation
of nuclear power plants; 12 3 therefore, it is unclear if the Northern States rule
is also applicable to control over nuclear plant siting.
As noted previously, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 did not attempt 1 to
24
establish regulatory principles for a nonexistent nuclear power industry.
The Senate debate, lasting 200 hours, never dealt directly with the state
or local role in the commercial licensing procedure. 125 The legislative history
of the 1959 amendments is similarly devoid of any express statements as
to the effect of section 2021 on the state role in siting.126 The Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy briefly considered the role of the state in siting, but the
members' exchange was inconclusive.
Senator Hickenlooper: Let me ask you this: Suppose a plant wants
to locate adjacent to a city and the city says there is a radiation
hazard and "we will not tolerate it near this city." The commission
says, "There is no radiation hazards. We will locate the plant next to
the city." Do we take away from the city? That is what we do herewe take away from the city the right to determine that fact.
Representative Price: I do not think we would. You would honor the
zoning regulations of any state.
Senator Hickenlooper: I am not talking about recognizing or
about
honoring zoning regulations, or convenience, I am talking
2
legality. We have written too many statutes with shotguns.' 7
The apparent legislative reluctance to define expressly a large area of
preempted authority was recognized by Robert Lowenstein of the General
Counsel's Office of the AEC in his comments on subsection (k) before the
Joint Committee.
Mr. Lowenstein: We thought that this act without saying so in so
many words did make clear that there is preemption here, but we have
tried to avoid defining the precise extent of that preemption, feeling
that it is better to leave these kinds of detailed questions perhaps up
to the courts later to be resolved.
121.

The State of Maryland

has already entered this gray

area of constitutional

authority. It provides statutorily for state purchase of power plant sites. MD. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. §3-302 (1974). In the face of federal attempts to preempt the siting of nuclear plants,
more states may be tempted to follow Maryland's course of action.
122. See notes 91-98 supra and accompanying text. While state denial of a certificate
would preclude construction of a nuclear plant and thus not reach regulation by the AEC,
this is not equivalent to conflict that forces those subject to the regulations to violate a
regulation.
123. 447 F.2d at 1154.
124. See note 35 supra.
125. See Note, supra note 35, at 1017.
126. Id.
127. See 1959 Hearings,supra note 108, at 494.
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Representative Durham: I don't agree in writing an act like that.
I think it should be clearly defined and understood what is our field
and what is their field.
Mr. Lowenstein: I think this does do that Mr. Durham.
Representative Durham: I think so, too. If they want to set up a
licensing system, they can do it. The courts will decide it then, not us.
I think the law should be as dear as possible to avoid litigation. I am
not a lawyer, but I wonder if that is not a pretty clear statement of
what we intended to do, and what we are writing into the act.
pretty good legislative history
Mr. Ramsey: We are making some
128
on what the intention is right now.
In the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of an intent by
Congress to preempt the states' authority, the Supreme Court has refused
to find federal preemption over state health and safety laws. 129 The legislative
history of the 1959 amendments alone indicates that Congress did not focus
on the state role in siting. Further support of this position is apparent
when consideration is given to the other factors enumerated by the Northern
States court for determining congressional intent. 3 0
Exclusive federal regulation of site-selection criteria related to radiation
hazards would tend to achieve uniformity. However, the need for uniformity in this regard does little to aid the development of the nuclear industry. While regulation of effluents may affect many aspects of design, construction, and operation,' 31 site-selection criteria merely address the issue of
placement of the plant. 32 If siting criteria become so exacting as to modify
substantially the operation of a plant, then state control of siting may infringe on the federal authority over construction and operation of nuclear
plants. It should be noted that many state decisions have impacts on nuclear
power plant construction and operation, but inquiries into regulatory effect
of these decisions are limited to avoid drawing preemption questions to
33
absurd lengths.
Congressional purposes and objectives are not thwarted by according
current power to the states in siting of power plants. The legislative design
of the 1954 Act, as ascertained by the Northern States court, was "to foster
and encourage the development, use and control of atomic energy so as to
make the maximum contribution to the general welfare and to increase the
128. Id. at 307-08.
129. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Chicago, R.I. & Pa. R.R., 382 U.S. 423, 429
(1966); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 862 U.S. 440, 446 (1959); Missouri
Pa. R. Co. v. Norvood, 283 U.S. 249, 256 (1931).

130. See notes 90-98 supra and accompanying text.
131. 447 F.2d at 1149.

132. Regulation of radioactive effluents is inextricably intertwined with planning,
construction, and operation of the facility. The interdependence of these functions requires
uniformity of regulations; however, siting is a condition precedent to construction and

is thus separable.
13. For example, state regulation of uranium extraction from a phosphate mine may
increase the exposure of workers in a nearby nuclear reactor. Nonradiological environmental

regulation by a state concerning thermal pollution may affect thy design elements of a
system also controlling radiological pollution,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1976

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 6

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV1II

standard of living. ' ' 134 The court ascertained that the balancing of competing
interests must be accomplished according to uniform standards promulgated
by a national agency. 135 The court noted, however, that the need for uniformity of regulation arose from the real possibility that states may be so
overly protective in setting standards for radioactive effluent that industrial
development could be unnecessarily stultified. 136 In contrast, state consideration of issues involving radiation in a siting proceeding that granted a site
certificate need reduce neither the options available to designers in construction nor operation of the plant on a particular site." Although state denial
of any site certificate poses a threat to the ability of the industry to supply
sufficient power to the public, the state has the discretionary power to deny all
site certification for nonradiological safety reasons. 138 Practically speaking, the
potential of this speculative threat to the achievement of federal policies is
small.
The impact of a state's consideration of radiation issues in its siting proceedings would fall most heavily on technical personnel within the state
licensing authorities. Presently most states are limited by lack of resources
and manpower, and some states are having difficulty even funding the programs
developed pursuant to AEC-state agreement. 139 In addition, state consideration
of radiation safety issues in site certification proceedings could confuse the
public. As a result of varigated proceedings, proprietary information may be
compromised and the cost of the licensing process may increase to a point
that retards development of the nuclear power industry. 40 The applicability
of these considerations to the issues of preemption of a state siting role is
debatable; moreover, many of these problems could be eliminated by the
projected passage of federal legislation providing for coordination of planning
between the AEC and the states and for the authorization of consolidated
141
hearings with state agencies.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument in favor of a comprehensive state
role in the siting of nuclear plants derives from the traditionally recognized
state control over land uses. Northern States did not involve federal assumption of a traditional state role in view of the unique development of the
134. 447 F.2d at 1153.
135. Id. at 1154.
136. Id.
137. The AEC proceedings generally concern themselves with whether "reasonable
assurances" exist that a plant can safely be constructed and operated at a particular site.
See note 155 infra and accompanying text. The trade-offs between alternative possible sites
are usually not at issue in the agencies' public proceedings. The industry is now developing
standardized plant designs adapted to different types of potential reactor sites.
138. Northern California Ass'n v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 126, 390 P.2d 200, 37
Cal. Rptr. 432 (1964). Such a course, however, would meet strong political opposition. Even
if successful locally, a strong federal response specifically providing for federal selection
of all nuclear sites could result.
139. 1974 Hearings,supra note 17, at 23, 43.
140. See Helman, Preemption: Approaching Federal-State Conflict Over Licensing Nuclear Power Plants, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 43, 67 (1967).
141. Two bills, S. 1717 and H.R. 7002, that were considered in the 94th Congress
would accomplish this result, if passed. See S. 1717 & H.R. 7002, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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nuclear power industry. 142 Federal limitations on the state powers to control

land uses and zoning are beyond the authority granted to the AEC by the
143
1946 and the 1954 Acts.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Examining the role of the NRC in the siting context is important in
analyzing alternative state roles. 44 Initially, a utility applicant's first submission to the NRC is a preliminary safety analysis report 4 5 that is included
in tie initial submission of every application for a construction permit. 14 6
The application must include a description and safety analysis of the site on
which the nuclear plant is to be located,' 47 with special attention 4s directed
to such factors as the intended use of the reactor, population density and
use characteristics of the site environs, and physical characteristics of the
site, including seismology, meteorology, geology, and hydrology.. 9 A NRC
staff then makes an evaluation of the construction application. The evaluation is followed by a formal public hearing, pursuant to the Administrative
Procedures Act, 50 before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB).'51
The Commission then may issue a construction permit' 52 if four conditions
relating to design preparationand safety are satisfied. 53 The first three conditions require the applicants to adequately describe the design of the facility,
complete the safety analysis, detail the relevant safety features, and present
a program to resolve remaining safety questions. 5 4 The fourth condition
requires more substantially that:

142. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
143. Federal ownership of nuclear facilities and radioactive materials does not pose
a threat to traditional state powers. If the federal government is to intrude into traditionally
state matters, the legislative directive must be clear. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218 (1947).
144. See, Hennessey, Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants by the AEC, 15 WM. & MARY L.
Rav. 487 (1974).
145. 10 C.F.R. §50.34 (1975).
146. Id. §50.35.
147. Id. §50.34. Only the site proposed is included in this analysis. No alternative site
need be considered.
148. Id.
149. Id. §100.10(a) (1975). Additional reactor site criteria include the extent to which
generally accepted engineering standards are applied to the design of the' reactor, the
reactor's unique or unusual features that have a significant bearing on the probability or
consequences of accidental release of radioactive materials, and the "safety features that
are to be engineered into the facility and the barriers which must be breached as a
result of an accident, before a release of radioactive material to the environment can
occur." Id.
150. 5 U.S.C. § §551-59 (1970).
151. 10 C.F.R. §2.721(a) (1975).
152. Id. §50.35. The construction permit may be provisionally issued for any facility
if application and a notice of hearing was published on or before March 30, 1970. Id. at n.l.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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There is reasonable assurance that a) safety questions will be resolved
before completion of construction; and b) the proposed facility can be
constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk
to the health and safety of the public15r
The foregoing description of NRC procedure reveals the limited discretion
of the agency. A construction permit will be issued if certain criteria are
satisfied.'5 6 At no point are alternative sites required to be considered.1 57 Thus,
if "reasonable assurance" exists that the public health and safety is protected,
the permit must be granted. "Reasonable assurance" does not require a
balancing of alternatives between sites, but rather a weighing of technology,
the economics of increased safety, and the need to utilize atomic energy in
the public interest against the potential benefits or hazards posed to the
public health and safety.

158

If a state is precluded from considering radiation aspects of health and
safety, the trade-offs between alternative sites may never be fully evaluated.
While two sites may both provide "reasonable assurances," one may be
superior to another in that fewer safety-related costs may be incurred or that
the public may be subjected to fewer radiation hazards. Thus, considering
alternative sites would reduce the number of trade-offs of public safety for
the advantage of industry growth. 159
The complex questions posed by the NRC licensing procedure present
perhaps the strongest argument against state maintenance of a technical role
in nuclear facility siting. Addressing itself to complex questions of radiation
safety, the state would require the services of highly trained scientists and
engineers. The ensuing financial burden is beyond the resources of many
states. State governments may also have difficulty attracting sufficiently

155. Id. (emphasis added). Appeal from a decision of ASLB may be taken to the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board. 10 C.F.R. §2.785 (1975). The NRC may review
decisions of this board in limited areas of major significance. Otherwise, decisions may only
be reviewed under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§701-06 (1970) and the
Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. §§2341-53 (1970).
156. 10 C.F.R. §50.45 (1975). The criteria are included in 10 C.F.R. §§50.31-38 (1975).
157. Alternative sites may be considered in the "Applicant's Environmental ReportConstruction Permit Stage," which accompanies an application. 10 C.F.R. §51.20(a) (1975).
While this report must consider alternatives to the proposed action, no alternative sites
are required to be realistically evaluated. Id.
158. An example of the type of balance struck in NRC proceedings is implied in its
definition of "as low as practicable" referring to the maximum level of radioactive material
in effluent. Id. §50.34(a). "The term 'as low as practicable' as used in this part means
as low as is practicably achievable taking into account the state of technology, and the
economics of improvements in relation to benefits to the public health and safety and in
relation to the utilization of atomic energy in the public interest." Id.
159. Florida is in a particularly advantageous position to avoid site selection that locks
an industry and the NRC into unnecessary trade-offs by virtue of its 10-year site plan
and early selection of general locations for proposed nuclear plants. FLA. STAT. §403.505
(1975). Perhaps such a plan could avoid siting of nuclear power plants on even inactive
geologic faults. See North Anna Environmental Coalition v. NRC, 8 ERC 1770 (1976) (NRC
issuance of construction permit for nuclear unit on geologic fault was found based on
"reasonable assurance" that plant could be operated without undue risk).
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qualified technicians and engineers. 160 In addition, prohibitive costs may be
shifted to the applicant and delays may accrue from state inability to handle
the work load.
On the other hand, state expertise in the nuclear field has been developing.
As of 1974, twenty-five states had developed sufficient programs to enter into
agreements with the NRC under section 2021 to assume a part of its
regulatory authority."' States have always had regulatory authority over
natural radiation, x-ray, and gamma ray machines.' 62 Some states have developed sufficient expertise over nuclear reactors to perform environmental
and effluent monitoring at the site. The purpose of this later NRC program
is to provide independent measurements of radioactivity in the environment
and effluent, and to provide a check on the analysis conducted by the
licensee.6 3 The state capabilities in this specialized field seem to be developing
as envisioned by the 1959 Congress.' 6 Additionally, state consideration of
nuclear hazards need not preclude NRC assistance and technical help. While
state capabilities may only be supplementary to NRC capabilities, they may
nevertheless provide the additional function of weighing advantages of alternative sites at the earliest opportunity. Furthermore, states already are
developing sophisticated expertise in environmental analysis. Close factual
questions may arise as to whether pollution is caused by radiation or another
pollutant. 165 To preclude state consideration of such issues would fragment
decisions related to pollution. 16
State control over other radiation hazards illustrates both a developing
state expertise and a need to recognize Florida's unique problems. Florida's
Polk County produces more than 80 percent of the phosphate mine rock
produced in the United States.167 Uranium can be extracted from phosphate,
and Florida has the potential to produce sufficient uranium to satisfy half
of its electrical power needs for the next 30 years. Home construction on reclaimed phosphate mining lands, however, poses health dangers to residents.
A recent Environmental Protection Agency study revealed that several Polk
County buildings reached radioactive levels surpassing the maximum safety
limits.168 Since the NRC does not control uranium mining operations,1 9 the
160. See, e.g., Helman, supra note 140, at 63.
161.
162.

See 1974 Hearings,supra note 17, at 587.
See note 38 supra.

163. 1974 Hearings, supra note 17, at 587. Twenty states in 1974 had such cooperative
arrangements.
164. See note 35 supra. But see note 21 supra for difficulties in state regulation of
radiological hazards.

165. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1157 (8th Cir. 1971) (Van
Oosterhouts, J. dissenting). For example, the hearing examiner in the Florida Power and
Light proceeding expressly did not decide whether alternative heat-sink methods such as

ocean intakes or cooling towers included preempted radiological health and safety matters.
See Order May 13, 1975 supra note 1.
166. 447 F.2d at 1157.
167. Gainesville (Fla.) Sun, Oct. 8, 1975, §D, at 3, col. 1. Ninety-one percent of the
phosphate mine rock used in the nation in 1973 came from Florida and more than
90% of Florida's production occurred in Polk County. Id.
168. Id.
169. Selected Materials, supra note 27, at 395. The NRG licenses mines but does not
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